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Abstract  
 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the use and meaning of the concept of 
relativism in the context of National Socialism (NS). Section 1 examines the critical 
reproach that NS is a form of relativism. I analyze and criticize the common core of 
this widespread argument which has dominated discussions about the topic up to 
the present. Section 2 sketches the general debates on relativism before and 
during NS. I show that fascist thought could be associated with both relativism and 
anti-relativism. In contrast to the received view, I argue that Nazi intellectuals 
regarded relativism as problem, and presented NS as the overcoming of relativism. 
Subsequently I turn to two major philosophers who connected their philosophy 
with NS. Section 3 investigates Bruno Bauch’s (1887–1942) nationalist philosophy. 
I show that he linked his concept of the nation with an objectivist value theory 
intended to oppose all kinds of relativism. Section 4 turns to Erich Rothacker’s 
(1888–1965) cultural anthropology. I argue that the revision of his philosophical 
views in the 1930s was accompanied by a political turn towards NS and a 
withdrawal from relativism. The brief conclusion (Section 5) summarizes the 
findings of the chapter. I conclude that, in the context of NS, relativism is mostly 
used in a pejorative sense.    
 
1. The Received View: NS as Relativism  
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Relativism and NS are often associated with each other in the philosophical 
literature. This association is used as a critical argument against both. The weakest 
form of this argument runs as follows:  
 
Relativism involves the idea that there are many radically different, yet 
equally valid, epistemic or moral systems. The “equal validity” idea 
commits the relativist to a strong form of tolerance even of morally and 
epistemically highly problematic systems of thought. Hence, relativism 
does not provide us with the normative resources to criticize irrational 
views such as Nazi racism. We need a normative universalism to confront 
racist ideologies (Böhler 1988, Tugendhat 2009, Kellerwessel 2014).  
 
The different versions of the above anti-relativist argument share a common core: 
Their advocates embed their identification of NS with relativism in a broader claim 
about the nature of philosophy. They argue that philosophy has to be based on 
reason and that this in turn commits one to absolute truth. Moreover, these 
authors defend the possibility of objective knowledge about reality and believe in 
a universal foundation of morality.  
 
The systematic criticism of relativism in the context of NS, is often supported by 
the historical argument that the relativism of post-Hegelian philosophy paralyzed 
the moral consciousness of German intellectuals during Weimar Republic. Their 
inability to mobilize universal moral principles is regarded as a reason for the rise 
of NS (Apel 1988). This historical argument can even take a stronger form. Some 
authors argue that the relativism of post-Hegelian philosophy is a prerequisite of 
Nazi ideology. Here Nazi ideology is classified as a radical kind of relativism that 
emerges from the general path of German philosophy after Hegel (Böhler 1988; 
Wolin 2004; Kellerwessel 2014).  
 
The identification of NS with relativism has a long history and is still popular today. 
The most influential account stems from Georg Lukács (1885–1971) in his 
polemical treatise Die Zerstörung der Vernunft (The Destruction of Reason, 1954). 
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The Neo-scholastic Josef de Vries (1898–1989) confronted Nazi philosophers with 
the charge of relativism already in the 1930s (de Vries 1935a; 1935b). Many of the 
critics, past and present, accuse especially historicism and Lebensphilosophie 
(philosophy of life) of having advocated a “dangerous” relativization of truth, 
knowledge, and values. On this view, the “relativistic nineteenth century” created 
a philosophical framework that enabled the flourishing of irrational beliefs, 
arbitrary maxims, and nihilistic attitudes. Ideologies such as NS are regarded as the 
ultimate step in the “destruction of reason” (Lukács 1954; see also de Vries 1935a; 
1935b; Lieber 1966; Apel 1988; Böhler 1988; Wolin 2004).  
 
Recent accounts highlight the destruction of moral rationality by the alleged 
relativism of Nazi racism. They read Nazi ideology as a biological determinism that 
attributes mutually exclusive sets of values to the assumed races. The particular 
values of a race are chosen arbitrarily and are understood only instrumentally: 
they serve the survival and flourishing of the respective race. The alleged racial 
hierarchy has no normative foundation and is thus completely arbitrary too. This 
“extreme relativism” of NS is defined as the opposite to moral rationality and is 
considered as an attack on philosophy itself (Böhler 1988; Tugendhat 2009; 
Kellerwessel 2014). Earlier accounts emphasize the opposition of NS to rationality 
in general. Lukács characterizes Nazi ideology as a modern myth that is nothing 
more than demagogic and nihilistic propaganda designed to deceive the 
population. Here NS is portrayed as the consequence of the decay of philosophy 
that was caused by relativism. Following Lukács, Hans-Joachim Lieber (1923–2012) 
explicitly defines NS as the “end of philosophy” (Lieber 1966, 93).i 
 
There are several reasons why the argument equating NS with relativism is 
problematic. First, it rests on strong background assumptions about the nature of 
philosophy and morality. Most presentations of the argument simply take 
absolute standards for granted.  
 
Second, “relativism” is used exclusively in a pejorative sense. And this pejorative 
use of the concept of relativism makes the historical argument problematic. The 
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historical accounts are uncharitable and not based on the detailed study of 
existing sources. Historicism and Lebensphilosophie are used as mere whipping 
boys.ii  
 
Third, the argument equating NS with relativism rests on a poor understanding of 
Nazi ideology. Recent historical research shows that Nazi ideology can neither be 
reduced to deceitful propaganda nor to simple biologism. The mere fact that many 
professional philosophers contributed to Nazi ideology should already make us 
doubt the equation of National Socialism with “the end of philosophy.”  
 
Fourth, and most importantly, most critical anti-relativists do not consider the 
actual debate about relativism in the context of NS. Since Nazi philosophers were 
accused of being relativists by their contemporaries such as de Vries (1935a; 
1935b), they engaged seriously with the problem of relativism. The actual 
contributions of Nazi philosophers to this debate reveal their self-understanding 
and are therefore an important source for defining the relation of NS to relativism. 
The critical analysis of this engagement also shows the meaning and use of the 
concept of relativism in the historical context. In the next section, I examine this 
historical context.   
 
2. The Historical Debate: NS versus Relativism 
 
Nazi intellectuals were confronted with philosophical problems such as relativism 
because of the comprehensive character of their political claims. NS considered 
itself as a political revolution that realizes a new image of the human. Recent 
historical research confirms the self-understanding and contemporary perception 
of NS as a weltanschauliche Bewegung (ideological movement; see Kroll 1998; 
Raphael 2014).  
 
The Nazis adopted the concept Weltanschauung (worldview) in order to highlight 
the comprehensive character of their movement. Because of its thoroughgoing 
political character, the Nazi Weltanschauung can be characterized as an ideology. 
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Nazi ideology has to be seen as a set of basic beliefs and convictions which left 
much scope for interpretation. Although key concepts like race had to be accepted 
as guidelines of thinking and acting, different interpretations of such ideological 
core elements coexisted and competed even in the inner circle of Nazi leadership. 
In short, there was no unified and mandatory ideological system of NS. 
Nevertheless, Nazi ideology was not a chimera. The “combination of fluidity and 
flexibility with a set of convictions and core arguments” (Raphael 2014, 74) shows, 
instead, that a political ideology works best as controlled plurality. Take the 
example of the concept of race: once you had accepted its key role for 
understanding whatever phenomenon interested you, you could still engage in 
heated debates on its meaning and significance. The range of views developed in 
the writings of NS leaders reached from bluntly biological conceptions (e.g. Darré 
[1902–1946]) to metaphysical interpretations of race (e.g. Rosenberg [1893–
1946)). Such obvious tensions were never removed and created the impression 
that NS was always in need of further explication.  
 
Philosophers in particular took up the task of elaborating, justifying, and 
explaining what NS truly is. Many German philosophers put their philosophy into 
political service. The gesture of general agreement with the political change and 
the willingness to work in the direction of the leader (dem Führer 
entgegenarbeiten) were even more widespread.iii 
 
NS and philosophy were linked by the concept of Weltanschauung. This vague 
concept generally connected philosophy and politics in the early twentieth 
century. The concept referred to comprehensive theories about the world that 
were meant to guide human actions. There was no sharp distinction between 
philosophy and Weltanschauung.  
 
Weltanschauungsphilosophie (philosophy of worldviews) became the dominant 
force in German-speaking philosophy during Weimar Republic. This is 
demonstrated by the influence of Oswald Spengler’s (1880–1936) Untergang des 
Abendlandes (Decline of the West; 1918/1922) on public discourse, on political 
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debates, and in academic philosophy (see e.g. Kusch 1995, 227 f.) Spengler 
connected a general theory of culture with a critical diagnosis of its current state. 
He claimed that Western culture had reached the final stage of cultural life. This 
state of decline could only be managed by the individual authority of a dictator. 
Spengler embraced the political idea of Caesarism and regarded Mussolini’s 
fascism as its modern realization (see Felken 2006, 1256 f.). This political 
conservatism was accompanied by a philosophical commitment to relativism. iv 
Spengler believed that all forms of human expression were determined by their 
historical context (Spengler 2006, VII, 31 f.). Human history consisted of the life of 
cultures. Spengler defined cultures as distinct organisms with individual, 
incommensurable characteristics. He thus combined historicism with cultural 
relativism.  
 
Other authors referred to the legacy of historicism by taking up Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
theory of worldviews within academic philosophy.v Erich Rothacker published a 
new Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Sciences; 
1920) that was followed by his Logik und Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften 
(Logic and System of the Human Sciences; 1926). In this period, Rothacker claimed 
that the methodological debates about scientific principles reflected fundamental 
“struggles of life” (1926, 112). He argued that these debates could be reduced to 
the fundamental differences of metaphysical Weltanschauungen. Rothacker 
regarded Weltanschauungen as rooted in decisions about life. They expressed 
practical demands and ethical postulates that could not be reconciled (137, 139). 
Rothacker highlighted the troubling consequences of his understanding of science. 
On his view, there was no science without presuppositions (voraussetzungslose 
Wissenschaft). Such positions were often accused of being relativistic.  
 
In his treatise from 1926, Rothacker explicitly addressed said problem of 
relativism. He distinguished between a positive and a negative kind of relativism. 
Rothacker suggested that “negative relativism” was a kind of skepticism that had 
to be rejected because of its “decomposing” effects (1926, 147 f.). “Positive 
relativism”, on the other hand, simply acknowledged that humans had to choose 
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among different possibilities of life. The choice between a plurality of values was 
guided by practical interests. Rothacker embraced this pragmatic principle and 
defined himself as a positive relativist. He regarded this position as a legacy of 
historicism. He affirmed the historicist’s emphasis on historical particularity also in 
the realm of politics. Rothacker praised cultural particularism and concluded in the 
last section of his systematic treatise: “Only on this ground, we philosophers are 
entitled to love our country” (171). Again, philosophical relativism was connected 
with political conservativism.vi  
 
Nazi ideology thus emerged in the context of a political discourse that associated 
some of its key convictions with relativism. This might lead one to expect that Nazi 
intellectuals referred to relativism in a positive way. This expectation is, however, 
not supported by historical evidence. The intellectual discourses of the Nazi era 
reveal a commitment to anti-relativism: For instance, the popular Meyers 
Dictionary of 1942 defined relativism as an attitude that represents the modern 
liberal-individualistic perplexity and lack of principles. “Jews” allegedly belonged 
here because of their disposition and intention to “decompose” society (Meyers 
Lexikon 1942: 290). Nazi scientists also rejected Einstein’s theory of relativity 
because of its alleged “decomposing” impact on society (see Herbert 2001, 12–14, 
213; Danneberg 2013, 74 ff.). Nazi accounts of contemporary philosophy defined 
relativism as a dangerous consequence of the modern spirit for which intellectual 
tendencies such as individualism, liberalism, historicism, and pragmatism were 
responsible.vii They often referred to German-Jewish philosophers such as Georg 
Simmel as prime examples of relativistic attitudes.viii In 1936, the historical-
philosophical class of the Prussian Academy of Sciences announced a prize 
question on the topic: “the inner reasons of philosophical relativism and the 
possibility of its overcoming.” The prize question presented relativism as 
philosophical problem that had to be overcome.ix   
 
This overview shows that the philosophical, scientific, and public debates during 
NS presented relativism as a problem. Moreover, anti-relativism featured 
prominently in antisemitic propaganda. It is thus not surprising that Nazi 
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intellectuals presented their worldview as the overcoming of relativism. The Nazi 
ideologue Alfred Rosenberg characterized the idea of the “relativity of the 
universe” as an “illness of our time” that was overcome by the “organic truth of 
NS” (1938, 694). Nazi philosophers such as Alfred Baeumler or Ernst Krieck were 
convinced that their position overcame the opposition between absolutism and 
relativism. They developed argumentative strategies to present NS as a third way 
in philosophy.x 
 
These anti-relativistic convictions of Nazi intellectuals expose the weakness of the 
received view of NS as relativism. Nazi ideology did not follow the relativistic 
strand of political conservativism, but adopted an anti-relativistic stance that was 
widespread in German-speaking philosophy (see, e.g., Kinzel, this volume.)  
 
This understanding of relativism shaped an important political debate during 
Weimar Republic. Anti-relativism was a key motivation for Carl Schmitt’s (1888–
1985) political conservativism. Schmitt claimed that liberal democracy was rooted 
in the relativism of modern thinking. He regarded the liberal politics of tolerance 
as a relativistic principle and identified this constitution with the decline of 
political authority. For Schmitt, Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) represented the 
relativistic mind-set of political liberalism (Schmitt 2009, 47–55; see also Schmitt 
1931; 1916, 59, 65, 67–70).xi Schmitt’s anti-relativism was explicitly connected 
with an antisemitic sentiment. Schmitt saw his controversy with Kelsen as a 
“struggle against the Jewish spirit”, his “true enemy” (see Gross 2016).  
 
In what follows, I want to take a closer look at two philosophical approaches to 
relativism during NS. Bruno Bauch and Rothacker connected their philosophies 
with NS and engaged with the problem of relativism. Moreover, their 
philosophical endeavors represent the two main tendencies of German-speaking 
philosophy before and during NS. Hans Sluga (1993) has convincingly shown that 
the diverse landscape of early twentieth-century philosophy was divided into two 
general camps: The “philosophical conservatives”, on the one hand, saw their 
philosophizing as the recovery of a great past. The neo-Kantian Bauch was one of 
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the most influential proponents of a distinctively “German” philosophy that was 
grounded in the idealist tradition of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. The “philosophical 
radicals”, on the other hand, demanded a radical new beginning and developed 
varying proposals for this task. Rothacker reinvented philosophy multiple times 
during his philosophical career and became a leading proponent of the 
“philosophical radicals” in the 1930s.  
 
3. Bruno Bauch’s Objectivist Nationalism   
 
The neo-Kantian Bauch was an influential figure in early twentieth-century 
philosophy. His infamous lecture Vom Begriff der Nation (On the Concept of the 
Nation)--given in 1916 and published as an article in 1917--caused a scandal that 
divided the philosophical community. The publication of Bauch’s nationalist and 
antisemitic views in Kant-Studien (Kant Studies), the journal of the Kant-
Gesellschaft (Kant-Society), prompted protests of German-Jewish philosophers in 
particular. In response Bauch founded the Deutsche Philosophische Gesellschaft 
(DGP; German Philosophical Society) as an alternative to the Kant Society. In one 
of its first programmatic statements, the society announced that it aimed to 
cultivate, deepen, and preserve the “German character” in philosophy.xii This 
program attracted all kinds of conservative, nationalist, and racist philosophers.  
 
Bauch believed that humanity consisted of distinct nations. He claimed that 
fostering nationalist attitudes was a prerequisite for the flourishing of humanity 
(1917, 160–162; see also 1935, 228). Bauch thus emphasized the general character 
of his nationalist views. In his article from 1917, he developed a völkisch 
particularism. He construed nations as distinct and mutually exclusive entities. The 
individual character of a nation could not be understood by members of another 
nation. Bauch explicitly denied “Jews” the ability to understand the cultural 
achievements of Germans.  
 
Bauch claimed that his concept of the nation followed the German tradition, 
especially Fichte (139 f., 149, 150–153). He held that nations were the synthesis of 
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a natural fact (natürliche Gegebenheit) and a cultural fact (kultürliche 
Gegebenheit). The nature of a nation consisted of biological, spiritual, and 
linguistic components. Bauch believed that human communities were rooted in 
biological groups. This biological link shaped the physical appearance of nations. 
He insisted that there were physical types that could be easily distinguished by 
their skin color, their face shape, their body type, and their skull shape (141, 144).  
He also claimed that the members of a nation shared a way of thinking, feeling, 
willing, and acting. This spiritual link constituted the distinct soul of nation (141–
144). Finally, the specific character of a nation was expressed in their common 
language (157 f.).  
 
The cultural unity of a nation was realized in history. Bauch claimed that nations 
developed self-consciousness through their history. They became aware of their 
historical destiny and expressed their national consciousness in cultural goods. 
From the perspective of culture, nationhood was thus a task that had to be 
fulfilled. Construed as an end, nationhood participated in the transcendent realm 
of values. Hence, nations possessed an objective meaning through their cultural 
existence (144, 148 f., 156–58). 
 
The particularist foundation of Bauch’s völkisch nationalism clearly had a 
relativistic tendency. Bauch distinguished a plurality of distinct nations and 
postulated an incommensurability between them. This view could prepare the 
ground for cultural relativism. Bauch, however, believed that his objectivist 
understanding of the cultural aspect of nations blocked the paths towards 
relativism. This conviction becomes apparent in a lecture from October 1933 
about Wert und Zweck (Value and Purpose) that was published in the 1934/35.xiii 
Bauch gave the lecture at the twelfth annual conference of the DGP. The 
conference was an occasion for the DPG to pledge its allegiance to the Nazi 
regime–Hitler indeed sent his greetings.xiv  
 
In his article from 1934/35, Bauch fiercely attacked critics of a transcendent realm 
of values. He characterized the deniers of the independence of objective values as 
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subjectivists. On Bauch’s view, all relationist concepts of values fell prey to the 
charge of subjectivism. He identified subjectivism with relativism. Bauch regarded 
pragmatism, utilitarianism, and materialism as modern kinds of philosophical 
relativism. He also referred to Plato’s devastating critique of Protagoras and 
agreed with its dehumanizing images: Bauch claimed that the denial of the 
objectivity of values revealed the personal inferiority of the relativists. Their 
subjectivism degraded them to the rank of “baboons”, “tadpoles”, or “pigs” with 
whom a discussion was superfluous (Bauch 1934/35, 43 f. 49 f.). 
 
Bauch connected his fierce polemic against relativism with a critique of his time. 
He praised NS as the political overcoming of the “pragmatist-materialist demon” 
(pragmatisch-materialistische Ungeist; 52) that haunted modernity. Intellectual 
developments such as individualism, atheism, or liberalism were characterized as 
“decomposing” the value foundation of society. The antisemitic character of 
Bauch’s critique of relativism was obvious in his discussion of science. Bauch held 
that pursuing truth was the sole task of all scientific endeavors. At the same time , 
he accused “Einstein, Freud, and co.” of trying to turn science into a tool for 
personal interests (53). He contrasted the alleged egoism of “Jewish” scientists 
with the German attitude to science: Germans were capable of doing science for 
its own sake. They acknowledged the unconditional value of truth. (52).xv  
 
4. Ernst Rothacker’s Realist Perspectivism   
 
Rothacker believed that one had to understand humanity through its cultural 
achievements. His thesis from 1912 takes Lamprecht’s historiography and Wundt’s 
Völkerpsychologie (ethnic psychology) as starting points for a biologistic concept of 
culture. After WWI, Rothacker’s philosophical interests changed significantly. He 
turned to Dilthey's theory of worldviews and developed a historicist 
understanding of humanity. In the 1920s--the middle period of his work--
Rothacker committed to “positive relativism” and explicitly took sides in politics. 
From 1919 to 1928, he was member of the Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s 
Party) which combined a skeptical attitude towards Weimar Republic with a 
  
 
12 
nationalist and business-friendly agenda. Around 1930, Rothacker began to 
develop his cultural anthropology and published two major treatises that set out 
his new views: Geschichtsphilosophie (Philosophy of History) in 1934 and Probleme 
der Kulturanthropologie (Issues of Cultural Anthropology) in 1942 (republished in 
1948). The second fundamental revision of his philosophical thought was 
accompanied by a political turn to NS. 
 
From the beginning, Rothacker associated the revision of his philosophical position 
with the rise of NS. His Geschichtsphilosophie from 1934 started with the claim 
that the upcoming “folkish consciousness” (volkstümliche Bewußtsein) constituted 
the beginning of a new epoch. Rothacker stated that his philosophy revealed the 
anthropological foundation of this historical transformation. Moreover, he 
concluded his Geschichtsphilosophie with an explicit political statement. The 
chapter Im dritten Reich argued that his philosophy belonged to the new world 
order by showing its conformity with key features of Nazi ideology.xvi 
 
Völkisch particularism was also at the core of Rothacker’s cultural anthropology. 
Human history was characterized by the struggle of particular communities for the 
realization of their life and their world (Rothacker 1934, 38). Philosophy had thus 
to provide insight into the “life laws of Völker” (Lebensgesetze der Völker; 5). 
Rothacker defined Völker as the “bearers and creators” of all “moral, cultural, and 
spiritual life” (38). Völker were characterized by both biological and cultural 
aspects. Rothacker held that Völker rested on biological groups: families, clans, 
and tribes were their biological sources which ensured the future of a community. 
The members of a community also shared a way of life and possessed common 
spiritual goods. A community established a specific attitude by its struggle with the 
natural and social environment (38). 
 
Rothacker held that cultures were rooted in shared ways of life. Cultures emerged, 
when the specific attitude of a community was completed in a “characteristic 
form” (durchgeprägte Form) that shaped all areas of life. Rothacker defined the 
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“characteristic form” of Kulturvölker (cultural people) as particular, collective, 
public, homogeneous, comprehensive, and productive (73–79; 1948, 68 f.).  
 
Rothacker’s particularist understanding of cultures obviously had a relativistic 
tendency. It was based on the conviction that there was no neutral response to 
the challenges of life. Rothacker referred to the pragmatic principle of active 
selection that grounded the “positive relativism” of his middle period. Immersed 
in a concrete situation, humans could only develop perspectival knowledge and 
partial solutions. Their knowledge and their activities were guided by their 
practical interests and specific desires. The partiality of knowledge and actions 
impacted the character of the emerging attitudes: these basic orientations in life 
possessed a weltanschaulich character. Rothacker assumed that our beliefs are 
dependent on the contexts we lived in. Moreover, the different ideological 
orientations of human life give rise to plurality of “won worlds” (erkämpfte 
Welten; 99 f.). Rothacker held that each culture created a particular world.  
 
Contrary to his middle work, the mature Rothacker explicitly rejected the label 
relativism for his perspectivist view. He illustrated the non-relativistic feature of 
his mature perspectivism by a simple example: What a farmer spontaneously 
interprets as “wood”, the forester takes as a forest, the hunter as a hunting 
ground, and the fugitive as a hiding place (Rothacker 1934, 85 f.; see also 1948, 
161, 170 f.). Rothacker argued that these divergent perspectives reveal different 
aspects of the same reality and do not contradict each other (Rothacker 1934, 86; 
1948, 173, 177).  
 
Rothacker used the realist core of his mature perspectivism to rank communities. 
He assumed that some human groups developed better responses to the practical 
challenges of life. Cultures were thus an achievement of communities. Human 
history was shaped by the cultural existence of certain Völker who constituted the 
peak of human excellence. Only these communities possessed historical 
significance. All other human groups were forgotten–and justifiably so (see, e.g., 
Rothacker 1934, 53). This view shows us the main reason for the rejection of 
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relativism by Nazi philosophers: They were convinced that there was a hierarchy 
of Völker and believed in an objective justification of their ranking.   
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter started with a critical examination of the widespread reproach that 
relativism and NS are connected historically as well as systematically. My 
investigation of the historical context revealed a rather different picture: Nazi 
intellectuals presented NS as the overcoming of the problem of relativism. The 
prevalence of anti-relativist motifs in Nazi debates is especially significant because 
a similar kind of fascism committed to relativism at that time.  
 
The anti-relativistic tendency of Nazi thought was confirmed by the views of two 
major philosophers who associated their philosophy with NS. Bauch welcomed NS 
with a lecture that included a fierce polemic against relativism. His polemics also 
demonstrated that modern anti-relativism could rely on popular motifs from the 
philosophical tradition. Anti-relativist sentiments were thus a strong motivating 
factor for the philosophical collaboration with NS.  
 
The development of Rothacker’s philosophy was characterized by significant 
changes. Rothacker committed to the “positive relativism” of historicism during 
the 1920s. The revision of his philosophical views was, however, accompanied by a 
political turn to NS and a withdrawal from relativism in the 1930s.  
 
Both cases showed that Nazi philosophers had to reconcile the relativistic 
tendency of their völkisch particularism with the anti-relativistic assumptions of 
their views. They believed in the superiority of certain Völker and races. Bauch 
argued that nationalism belonged to the transcendent realm of objective values. 
Rothacker insisted on the realist foundation of his perspectivism.  
 
My chapter also demonstrates the pejorative meaning of term relativism in the 
context of NS. Nazi intellectuals and Nazi critics shared a specific understanding of 
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relativism: They all considered relativism as a fundamental problem that had to be 
overcome. Relativism often covered alleged intellectual “ills” such as subjectivism, 
historicism, skepticism, materialism, or nihilism. Moreover, “relativism” was 
mostly used in a polemical sense: relativists were always the others, the 
philosophical and/or political enemies. To label someone a relativist was almost 
tantamount to making him an enemy.  
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